


Online Appendix

In this appendix we present graphs of the Principal Branch of the Multinomial Logit Correspondence (MLC) for $N = 12$ and $\mu \in [0, 10]$. We present all the 31 unique distributions regarding quasi-symmetric strategies¹. In some cases, the principal branch contains “backward bending” portions, i.e., the branch does not always move monotonically w.r.t. to μ . This leads to multiple equilibria. In order to select one of the equilibria in these cases² we applied a “first-pass criteria”.³ In the “first-pass” criteria we select the first equilibrium computed on any given μ when tracing the correspondence from $\mu = \infty$ toward $\mu = 0$. The intuitive reasoning is that if any learning process applies, it is more reasonable to assume that it moves from more to less noisy behavior than the other way around.

The graphs also show average behavior per experimental electorate, plotted over $\mu = 0.55$, the value used for deriving predictions.

This appendix also includes a table with the limiting MLC.







Graphs















¹Consider the distributions: $(5, 4, 3)$ and $(3, 4, 5)$. In both cases, the players from the group with 5 voters have as second most preferred option the most preferred option of players from the group with 4 voters. Similarly these voters have as their second most preferred option the most preferred option of players from the group with 3 voters, who, in turn, have as their second most preferred option the most preferred option of the players from the group with 5 voters. Therefore, both distribution have identical MLC when comparing groups by size.







²Selection of one equilibrium per distribution is necessary for weighted average computations.






³Full graphs are available upon request.











Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Sincere		Strategic		Third Option	
			$u^m = 3$	$u^m = 8$	$u^m = 3$	$u^m = 8$	$u^m = 3$	$u^m = 8$
4	4	4	1	0.8767	0	0.1233	0	0
5	3	4	0.671	0.8295	0.3158	0.1705	0.0132	0
5	4	3	0.5865	0.7289	0.3994	0.2711	0.0141	0
5	5	2	0.7572	0.6293	0.2316	0.3707	0.0111	0
6	1	5	0.9167	0.9167	0.0833	0.0833	0	0
6	2	4	0.8333	0.8333	0.1667	0.1667	0	0
6	3	3	0.75	0.75	0.25	0.25	0	0
6	4	2	0.6667	0.6667	0.3333	0.3333	0	0
6	5	1	0.5833	0.5833	0.4167	0.4167	0	0
6	6	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
7	0	5	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
7	1	4	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
7	2	3	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
7	3	2	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
7	4	1	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
7	5	0	0.7222	0.7222	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389	0.1389
8	0	4	0.778	0.6708	0.1111	0.3098	0.1109	0
8	1	3	0.778	0.8058	0.1111	0.1724	0.1109	0.0218
8	2	2	0.778	0.7807	0.111	0.1351	0.1109	0.0506
8	3	1	0.7781	0.801	0.111	0.1241	0.1109	0.075
8	4	0	0.7781	0.781	0.111	0.1097	0.1109	0.1093
9	0	3	0.8348	0.7907	0.0836	0.2087	0.0816	0.0007
9	1	2	0.8353	0.8266	0.0832	0.1537	0.0815	0.0197
9	2	1	0.8357	0.8555	0.0829	0.1019	0.0814	0.0426
9	3	0	0.8359	0.8497	0.0827	0.0778	0.0813	0.0725
10	0	2	0.8861	0.8349	0.0587	0.1602	0.0551	0.0049
10	1	1	0.8871	0.8922	0.0579	0.087	0.055	0.0208
10	2	0	0.8877	0.9031	0.0574	0.053	0.0549	0.044
11	0	1	0.9293	0.9127	0.037	0.0788	0.0338	0.0085
11	1	0	0.9305	0.939	0.0359	0.0348	0.0337	0.0262
12	0	0	0.9651	0.9605	0.0179	0.023	0.017	0.0165

Table 1: Limiting MLC, $\mu = 10^{-6}$