Please find bellow current versions of my working papers as well as presentation slides.
Comments are always welcome, but please do not cite before asking me.
We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus on how information about the distribution of preferences affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option to investigate how this affects the strategic vote. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and proves to be a good predictor for the experimental data. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises, the extent of which depends on (i) the availability of information; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; and (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in a voter’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.
JEL Classification: C92, D72, D83
Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game (2010)(with Luca Corazzini) ISLA Working Papers, 37. Working Paper
Does the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency account for subjects' overcontribution in public good games or is this mostly noise? Using a bounded rational
equilibrium approach, we aim at estimating the relative importance of effciency concerns relative to a noise argument. By using data from a VCM experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response
equilibrium (QRE) extension of a model in which subjects have preference for group
efficiency. Under the hypothesis of homogeneous population most of the over-contribution of
contributions seems to be explained by noisy behaviors. A different picture emerges
when we introduce cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for group efficiency. In this
case, the majority of the subjects makes contributions that are compatible with the
hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency. A formal likelihood-ratio test strongly
JEL classification: C92, D03, D71.
Information and economic voting (2010) (with Jon Rogers)
Despite the vast literature on economic voting, there is no agreement on what influence, if any,
economic considerations at the various possible levels (personal, community, or sociotropic)
have upon presidential approval and vote choice. Part of the reason for this disagreement is
the inherent complexity of the political environment. Thus, in a setting devoid of all but
economic considerations, this experimental study allows for variation across the three levels of economic conditions, directly caused by executive behavior, and tests for pocketbook,
communal, and sociotropic effects. Specifically, by manipulating the distribution of incomes
within and between communities, and by allowing subjects to request certain economic indicators, we gain leverage on what information is relevant and to what extent “the economy” matters.
This project offers what we believe to be the first experimental study to explicitly study
Information and Strategic Voting: Heterogeneous Preferences (2010)
I study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. Because of the possibility of Arrow's cycle, strategic voting may emerge. In particular, we focus on how information contained in election poll results affects voter's choices. This study builds upon a former study by the author. In particular, the present model normalizes the payoffs of the best and worst options, but allow the payoff of the intermediate option to vary within an electorate. Three information conditions are tested: no information, in which voters know only their own preference ordering and the own payoff for the intermediate option; aggregate info, in which in addition they know the aggregate realized distribution of the preference orderings and full info, in which the realized distribution of the payoffs for the intermediate option is also known. Results shows that the experimental results are quite robust with respect to heterogeneity and the information about aggregate distribution of preferences is the most relevant in affecting voting behavior.
JEL Classification: C92, D72, D83
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2010) (with Thomas de Haan, working title)
In this study we develop and algorithmic search procedure that allow institutions to evolve in order to maximize a given fitness function.
Empirical Strategy for Case Selection (2008) (working Title, with Ciro Biderman)
In this study we propose a empirical way to select cases for in depth analysis. The criteria bases itself in eliminating candidates whose general regression analysis would fit the model highly.